zkSI zkSI

zkSI[docs]draft
how itworks,
what itcan't hide

Everything here describes a design. The network is not live; v0 runs locally in your browser in the lab. Every statement carries its status, so you always know what is built, what is planned and what is still open.

status: conceptupdated 2026.10.16
[ read ]
[01] overview

A crowd you can hide in, from day one.

STATUS: CONCEPT
The network is not live: no miners, no gateways, no contracts, no nodes. v0 runs locally in your browser in the Noise Lab. There is no token.
DECIDED
agreed; changes are announced
PLANNED
on the road, not built yet
CONCEPT
part of the design, can change
[VERIFY]
open question or not checked yet

zkSI is a design for private SI requests based on noise mining. CONCEPT

A fixed volume of traffic hides the real requests. When real traffic is low, miners fill the gap with decoy requests. When real traffic grows, the decoys shrink. CONCEPT

The problem it targets: a private network is only as private as its crowd. With 50 users, there is no crowd. zkSI pays for the crowd until real users replace it. CONCEPT

the crowd problem
noise off · 50 requests · each one is a person
ILLUSTRATION  orange = a real person. with noise on, an observer sees 1,000 requests that look the same.
[02] how it works

A fixed target. Miners fill the gap.

The network aims for a fixed target volume, for example 1,000 requests per minute. The real value is not decided. CONCEPT

Miners deliver the difference between the target and real traffic, and are paid for that volume. CONCEPT

one minute of traffic · 1,000 slots
real50
decoys from miners950
noise share95%
miners paid for950
SIMULATION  target 1,000 is an example. miners are paid for target minus real. turn on observer view to see what anyone watching the traffic sees.
real requests / mindecoys from minersnoise share
5095095%
50050050%
90010010%

Noise matters most at the start and falls on its own as the network grows. What happens when real traffic goes above the target is not decided. [VERIFY]

as the network growsreal 50 · decoys 950
ILLUSTRATION  the shape of the idea, not a forecast. the line on top is the only thing an observer sees: flat.
[03] two kinds of noise

Cheap at the network. Expensive at the model.

NZ.NET · network noiseNZ.END · endpoint noise
what it isFake packets from client into the mixnetDecoy requests that reach the model
where it endsDropped at the last nodeAnswered by the SI provider
costCheap, no inferenceExpensive, real inference
who it confusesNetwork observersThe SI provider
statusCONCEPTCONCEPT
ILLUSTRATION
dropped at last hop0
reached the model0
yours, delivered0
decoy inference$0.00 - $0.00
ESTIMATE  inference counter uses ~$0.001-0.005 per decoy on a cheap model. a top model costs ~10x. network decoys cost nothing at the model because they never get there.

The Noise Pool pays mainly for endpoint noise, because that is where the cost is. CONCEPT

In v0, each user runs a local decoy generator and pays for their own noise. Requests use fixed size classes so size does not reveal which ones are real. PLANNED

Decoys only work if they look like real requests. A generator that does not copy real request patterns can be detected. See Risks. CONCEPT

[04] what each party sees

Pick a seat. Watch the traffic.

    SIMULATION
    IPs are from documentation ranges, prompts are made up. "show which ones are real" only exists in this demo: no party in the network has that button.
    partyseesshould not see (design goal)
    Your clientYour real requests-
    First mixnet nodeYour IP, that you send traffic, whenContent, which packets are real
    Last mixnet nodeTraffic leaving the mixnetYour IP
    GatewayRequest content, audit nullifiersYour IP. Whether it can tell real from decoy: [VERIFY]
    SI providerContent of every request and response, real and decoyYour IP, which requests are real
    MinerOnly its own decoysYour requests
    Chain observerStakes, commits (hashes), audit results, payoutsAny request content

    All rows: CONCEPT. The exact view of each node depends on the mixnet used, which is not decided. [VERIFY]

    What zkSI does not hide

    The SI provider still reads the content of your real request. If your prompt contains your name, your email or text that only you would write, noise does not protect you. zkSI hides which request is yours, not what it says. CONCEPT

    what the SI provider readsILLUSTRATION
    request · size class M · real? ?
    names and address are made up. the content is the leak, not the route.

    > next: threat model, proof of noise, noise pool, cost, cryptography, verification, risks, roadmap, disclosure, faq. in progress.